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1 


THE 


DRAMATIC  AND  MIMETIC  FEATURES 


GORGIAS  OF  PLATO 


BY 


J.  'V^^. 


BARKER  NEWHALL,  M.A. 


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A  DISSERTATION  PRESENTED  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY. 


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BALTIMORE: 

PRESS  OF  ISAAC  FRIEDENWALD  CO. 

189I. 


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THE 

1. 


DRAMATIC  AND  MIMETIC  FEATURES 


OF   THE 


GORGIAS  OF  PLATO 


BY 


BARKER  NEWHALL,  M.  A  , 


A  DISSERTATION  PRESENTED  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY. 


1891 


BALTIMORE: 

PRESS  OF  ISAAC  FRIEOENWALD  CO. 

189I. 


'^im^ 


>^»>jiMiF.:'.f^'.^-T^^;;-^yfc:i/^  ^ ■' ,.  ■■ 


CONTENTS. 

Introduction '     .        .    i 

GORGIAS 4 

POLUS 8 

POLUS  AND  CaLLICLKS II 

CALLICLES  .  . 12 

Chaerephon 15 

Socrates  : 

I.  Personality 16 

(A).  Language 16 

(B).  Character 21 

II.  Philosophy 22 

(A).  Sources     ...........  22 

(B).  Method      .         . 22 

(C).  Doctrines 24 


Prefatory  Notes. 

(i).  The  proportion  of  participation  is  (excluding  formulae  of 
question  and  answer,  and  direct  quotations)  for  Socrates  77^  per 
cent ;  Callicles  i^}  per  cent ;  Polus  4  per  cent ;  Gorgias  3-j^  per 
cent ;  Chaerephon  ,78  per  cent. 

(2).  For  the  genuine  dialogues,  to  Teuffel's  list  were  added  the 
lo,  Menexenus,  and  Parmenides. 

Literature. 

Gorgias. — Besides  Foss  (1828),  Blass,  Attische  Beredsamkeit' 
(pp.  47-91),  1887,  and  Diels  (Berlin  Acad.  1884)  ;  Schanz  :  Bei- 
trage  zur  vorsokrat.  Philosophic  aus  Platon,  I,  1867. 

Socrates:  van  Heusde:  Characterismi  principum  philoso- 
phorum  veterum,  1839 ;  Kochly :  Socrates  und  sein  Volk,  Vor- 
trage  (219-386),  1859.     (See  also  pp.  22,  24.) 

Plato:  Olympiodorus  :  /7/)a?£t?  ;r£,o} -ou /'ojo^joti,  Jahn's  Archiv, 
XIV  47  ff. ;  van  Prinsterer:  Prosopographia  Platonica,  1823; 
Hirzel:  Das  Rhetorische  bei  Platon,  1871  ;  Novak:  Platon  und 
die  Rhetorik,  Jahrb,  Phil.  Sup.  XIII  443  f. ;  B6nard  :  Platon  his- 
torien  de  la  Sophistique,  Acad.  Sci.  Mor.  (p.  338  f),  Paris,  1885. 


THE  DRAMATIC  AND  MIMETIC  FEATURES  OF 
THE  GORGIAS  OF  PLATO. 


Introduction. 

The  great  mimetic  and  dramatic  powers  of  Plato  were  recog- 
nized by  the  ancient  world.  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  (ad 
Pomp.   I)    says    xwfKpSsi   robi  npu  laurou    .  ,   .     Fopyta'^  xai  llmktiv 

xrX.,  and  elsewhere  (Rhet.  X  2,  XI  6)  alludes  to  his  skilful 
■^donoUa,  while  Basilius  Magnus,'  citing  three  of  his  characters, 
writes  rrapaxcuiiwdei  to.  Ttpoawiza.  Olympiodorus  opens  his  com- 
mentary with  the  remark  ol  <ptk6<To<pot  .  .  .  dadyouai  -puawna 
diaXsyo/ieva  .  .  .  xai  i^  tu,/  fOiyyovTat  rd?  Cwdy  ^apaxTspH^ouar/,  and 
adds  that  Socrates  strengthens  (xpazuvet)  the  speech  of  Callicles 
that  he  may  not  gain  an  empty  victory.  We  know  from  the 
same  authority  that  Plato  was  a  close  student  of  the  mimes  of 
Sophron  and  of  Aristophanes,  to  whose  influence  were  due  the 
mimetic  features  of  his  dialogues.  The  division  of  his  works 
into  tetralogies  by  Thrasyllus,  and  into  trilogies  by  Aristophanes 
of  Byzantium,  also  bears  witness  to  the  general  feeling.  Modern 
criticism  has  more  than  confirmed  the  judgment  of  antiquity. 
We  admire  the  solemn  tragedy  of  the  Phaedo  as  well  as  the 
bright  comedy  of  the  Protagoras,  while  the  graceful  introduction 
to  the  Phaedrus,  the  rhetorical  parody  of  the  Menexenus,  and 
the  wonderful  microcosm  of  the  Symposium  all  show  the  touch 
of  a  master  hand.  Indeed,  only  in  his  latest  and  most  metaphysical 
dialogues  do  we  wholly  miss  the  dramatic  coloring,  which  adorns 
alike  his  maiden  essay  and  his  maturer  work.  So  real  do  the 
characters  seem  that  we  feel  with  van  Heusde  that  while  others 
wrote  Socratic  dialogues,  Plato  alone  composed  mimes. 

The  dramatic  and  mimetic  art  of  Plato  has  been  quite  fully 
treated  by  von  Stein,  and  Taine  has  done  some  clever  work  in 
this  field  by  his  essay  "  Les  Jeunes  Gens  de  Platon,"  while  com- 
mentators and  critics,  notably  Steinhart,  have  incidentally  alluded 

'  Epist.  135,  V.  K.  O.  Miiller:  Gesch.  Griech.  Literat.  II  221,  n. 


to  its  more  apparent  manifestations.  The  a"'/"!*'?  of  the  Sympo- 
sium has  been  discussed  by  Professor  Gildersleeve  and  others, 
and  judging  from  the  title  "  Charakterbilder  aus  Protagoras,"  a 
certain  Mayr  of  Komotau  has  devoted  a  program  to  similar 
study  in  that  dialogue.  The  merry  satyr-drama,  the  Euthydemus, 
and  the  great  tetralogy,'  the  Republic,  with  their  wealth  of  finely- 
drawn  characters,  would  well  repay  special  investigation,  and  the 
more  juvenile  interludes,  Lysis,  Laches,  Charmides,  would  not  be 
without  interest.  Dramatic  analyses  of  the  Phaedo  by  Suckow, 
and  of  the  Republic  by  Bacher  deserve  mention.  Whether  the 
purpose  of  dramatic  form  be  merely  external  ornament,  or  the 
reinforcement  of  argument  and  the  vivifying  of  principles,  matters 
less  to  the  student  of  literature  than  to  the  philosopher.  We 
must  bear  in  mind  that  the  dialogue,  even  when  most  artistic,  is 
only  analogous  to  the  drama,  and  in  many  matters  of  detail  the 
resemblance  is  often  partial  or  faint.  Still  more  important  is  the 
typical  nature  of  Platonic  ixiixTjai^.    His  own  principle  is  stated  in 

the  Republic  (396  E)  iriuxpov  rt  /lipug  h  tzoXXui  Xoyu}  7^9  lupujasw^, 
and  he  deprecates  the  imitation  of  evil  characters,  unless  for  sport 
(1.  c  D  and  E).  The  characters  are  generally  few,  in  accordance 
with  antique  precedent,  and  their  delineation  is  not  allowed  to 
distract  attention  from  the  purpose  of  the  work.  They  are  repre- 
sentatives of  intellectual  and  moral  tendencies,  and  so  the  lines 
are  drawn  more  subtly  than  for  the  mere  individual.  For  the 
same  reason  only  certain  features  are  emphasized,  and  the  result 
is  often  more  or  less  one-sided.  Professor  Gildersleeve  has  noticed 
that,  when  the  space  is  limited,  the  portraiture  is  coarser  and  more 
exaggerated,  and  so  Prodicus  and  Thrasymachus  stand  in  bolder 
relief  than  Protagoras  and  Gorgias.  "Simple,  fine  and  intensive  " 
is  the  verdict  of  von  Stein,  and  this  fresh  and  delicate  rjOonotia 
would  alone  justify  his  title  of  "  Homer  of  philosophers."  Well 
does  van  Heusde  say  "risum  nobis  .  .  .  excitat  Lucianus,  hand 
secus  atque  Aristophanes,  in  Platone  legendo . . .  subridemus."  In 
a  word,  where  the  quality  is  fine,  the  quantity  is  small.  One 
drop  of  the  honey  of  Hymettus,  one  note  from  Apollo's  swan, 
may  fitly  shed  their  sweetness  over  an  entire  life. 

In  the  Gorgias  the  earnestness  of  thought  and  intensity  of 
feeling  exclude  the  brilliant  decoration  of  the  Protagoras,  yet  the 
art  of  the  master  is  far  from  lacking.     No  Platonic  dialogue,  says 

'  (l)  Satyr-drama,  Thrasymachus,  Book  I.     (2)  Rdhc,  II-IV  (p.  427).     (3) 
'Aw/p,  IV-VII.     (4)  AiKaioavvii,  VIII-X  (p.  612) — tfotSof  (612-621). 


3 

Steinhart,  so  closely  resembles  a  tragedy  in  its  lofty  pathos  of 
language  and  in  its  basic  thought — man's  presumption  opposed  to 
God's  eternal  law.  The  allusions  to  the  approaching  death  of  the 
chief  actor  (486  B,  511  B,  521  C),  and  to  the  heroism  of  his  life 
(473  E),  are  like  the  expressions  of  double  meaning  which  so 
often  foreshadow  the  catastrophe  of  a  Greek  tragedy,  and  of  which 
the  Oedipus  Tyrannus  affords  the  best  example.  These  premoni- 
tions find  peculiar  expression  in  an  ironical  form  (521  E),  when 
Socrates  parodies  his  own  trial  by  the  instance  of  a  physician 
who  is  accused  by  a  confectioner  before  a  court  of  boys.  The 
abundant  irony  and  word-play  as  well  as  the  occasional  oxymoron 
are  also  characteristic  of  tragic  diction.  Kochly  has  drawn  a 
skilful  parallel  between  the  Antigone  and  the  life  of  Socrates,  and 
thus  we  see  that  Plato  had  before  him  a  tragic  life  to  inspire  his 
drama.  Moreover,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  dialogue  falls  into 
five  parts,  corresponding  to  the  five  acts  of  a  tragedy.  They 
are:  (I)  the  TzpoXoyo^  (chap.  1-15);  (II)  the  first  episode,  or 
TtpoTa<Ti<s  (16-36);  (III)  the  second  episode,  or  i^rtraffj?  (37-54) ; 
(IV)  the  third  episode,  or  iierd^aaii  (55-78) ;  and  the  s^odu^ 
(79-83).  The  first  and  second  episodes  are  suitably  marked  by 
the  entrance  of  a  new  character,  and  the  third  by  the  partial 
retirement  of  the  second  actor.  The  only  vestiges  of  the  stasima 
are  the  summaries  of  the  argument  made  by  Socrates  at  the  close 
of  each  episode  (480  Ef.,  500  A-D,  522  C-E),  the  last  showing 
some  poetic  fervor.  The  parados  is  still  less  apparent.  A  faint 
trace  maybe  found  in  the  intermezzo  at  chap.  XIII,  where  serious 
and  positive  discussion  is  really  introduced  for  the  first  time.  The 
preceding  chapters  merely  define  the  sophistic  position,  the  internal 
principles,  as  the  short  prooemium  (chap.  I)  presents  the  characters 
and  scenery,  the  external  features  of  the  drama.  The  progress 
of  argument  follows  the  lines  of  development  of  a  tragic  plot,  so 
that  in  the  last  act  all  the  previous  discord  of  passion  grows  into 
purest  harmony.  Here,  too,  the  gods  appear  upon  the  scene, 
like  so  many  dez  ex  ntachina,  and  the  myth,  in  its  function  of 
exodus,  as  in  the  Republic,  "  points  the  moral,"  as  well  as  "  adorns 
the  tale."  The  final  chapter,  like  the  solemn  anapaests,  sums  up 
the  whole  thought  of  the  drama,  and  closes  with  a  personal  exhor- 
tation. The  chorus,  as  an  integral  part  of  the  action,  steadily 
decreased  in  importance,  and  in  Euripides  and  the  latest  works 
of  Aristophanes  it  occupies  comparatively  little  space.'     Here  it 

'v.  Haigh:  Attic  Theatre,  259-261. 


is  only  represented  by  the  silent  audience,  to  whom  allusion  is 
often  made  (447  C,  55  C,  73  E,  90  B),  and  whose  expressions  of 
interest  are  indicated  by  0(ipu[ios  (458  C).  Chaerephon  is  evidently 
its  coryphaeus.  He  assumes  its  mediating  functions,  evinces  its 
fussy  interest  in  the  action,  and  has  a  like  fondness  for  the  wise  saw 
and  trite  maxim,  but  he  lacks  the  lyric  beauty  of  their  speech. 
In  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  drama,  he  is  on  the  side  of 
the  protagonist,  who  is,  as  in  all  but  the  latest  dialogues,  Socrates 
himself.  Callicles  is  the  deuteragonist,  while  Gorgias  and  Polus, 
who  represent  one  and  the  same  stage  of  the  discussion,  together 
assume  the  r61e  of  the  third  actor. 

We  may  notice  the  artistic  placing  of  the  first  word,  TcoX^fiou, 
which  indicates  the  nature  of  the  dialogue,  and  the  pathetic  posi- 
tion of  the  last  word,  KaUixXtt':,  which  is  quite  consistent  with  the 
prominent  part  that  he  plays.'  It  is  well  to  notice  that  tragedy, 
not  comedy,  was  Plato's  model  in  economy,  nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  does  the  Gorgias  lend  itself  very  readily  to  a  comparison 
with  the  Pindaric  ode.'  The  asymmetry  which  the  Terpandrian 
system  of  analysis  produces  is  objectionable  in  Plato  as  well  as 
in  Pindar,  while  the  myth  here,  moreover,  is  at  the  close,  not  in 
the  centre.  The  third  act  resembles  the  aywv  of  the  comedy 
and  the  6ix<paX6<i  of  the  ode  merely  in  its  position  as  the  crisis  of 
the  action  and  the  kernel  of  the  thought  of  the  whole  dialogue. 
Further  comparison  would  be  fanciful.  In  regard  to  the  mimetic 
features  of  our  dialogue,  Bfenard  remarks  that  the  persons  are 
"  avec  pr6cision  caracteris6,  chacun  a  son  langage,  sa  manifere 
d'agir."  To  demonstrate  the  validity  of  this  claim  and  to  examine 
the  phenomena  upon  which  it  is  based,  the  investigation  embodied 
in  this  essay  has  been  made.  If  it  has  contributed,  however 
slightly,  to  a  clearer  insight  into  the  art  of  Plato,  it  has  fully 
achieved  its  purpose. 

Gorgias. 

Gorgias,  like  other  sophists,  busied  himself  with  the  study  of 
Homer.  He  put  Homer  after  Musaeus,  and  he  compared  the 
neglecters  of  philosophy  to  the  suitors  of  Penelope.  Moreover, 
he  wrote  encomia  of  Achilles  arid  Helen,  and  a  defense  of  Pala- 
medes.     Very  appropriately,  then,  almost  his  first  words  are  o  ye 

'  Cf.  fc($c,  Apol.,  Crito  (fin.),  Leg.  (init.) :  iroTuriKOv,  Polit.  (fin.) :  Uepaijv,  Aesch. 
Pers.  (init.):  stelle,  Dante,  Infer.,  Purg.,  Parad.  (fin.). 
«  Cf.  Suckow,  501  ff. 


eSxofiat  ehai,  &?  efTj'Otir]po<;  (449  A),  a  phrase  which  recurs  some 
twenty  times  in  the  great  epic.  Then,  too,  his  eini,  iitjSkv  ijik 
aiaxovOeii  (463  A)  maybe  a  reminiscence  of  /JLtjSi  tC  (i  aiSdiievoi; 
[lediaiTso  (y.  96).  In  450  B  we  meet  with  two  words  which  Olym- 
piodorus  tells  us  are  Sicelisms  (^Fopyia?  ai>Td<;  cm'  ixeivou  Ttpo<pipst 
rdf  ^^fe:?  iy^iopiouq  ouaaq'),  while  he  notes  that  Socrates  uses  xupo^. 
^eipobpyriiia  occurs  Only  here,  and  xupwaiq  elsewhere  only  in 
Thucyd.  and  Josephus.  The  former  may  easily  have  taken  the 
word  from  his  master,  and  Josephus  from  the  present  passage. 
This  seems  to  be  the  only  place  in  this  dialogue  where  the  local 
peculiarities  of  the  speakers  are  reproduced,  but,  like  the  frTo* 
Zsui;  of  Cebes  in  the  Phaedo  (62  A),  a  little  dialectic  color  is  given, 
and  the  reader  is  left  to  complete  the  picture.  So  the  Doric 
forms  sprinkled  through  the  chorus  of  the  tragedy  satisfied  the 
Athenian  mind  with  a  hint  of  the  lyric,  of  which  Doric  was  the 
type. 

Besides  dignity  and  conceit  (449  A,  C,  51  D,  55  D,  63  D)  we 
may  note  the  lofty  condescension  of  451  A  and  455  D.  He  is 
the  teacher,  and  Socrates  the  pupil,  a  delusion  which  the  latter 
encourages  by  his  modesty  (e.  g.  [lavOdvw,  450  D).  His  offer  to 
answer  all  questions  (448  A)  is  known  to  be  historic,'  and  a  sample 
of  his  skill  in  eluding  inconvenient  queries  is  seen  in  448  D. 
So  the  Scholiast  on  458  B  says  Jidotxev  6  Fopyia^  xai  tptbysi  T^v 
dtdXs^cv,  ahtazat  dk  roh^  T:ap6vTa<;  Tzavoupyw^  to?  ohx  avs^ofxivoui.  To 
this  trickery  we  may  compare  his  evasion  of  the  famous  bean 
puzzle,'  as  proposed  to  him  by  this  same  Chaerephon.  Perhaps 
the  most  apparent  imitation  of  Gorgias'  style  put  in  his  own  mouth 
is  found  in  452  E.  Notice  first  the  chiasm  of  beginning  and  end- 
ing, rreiOetv  .  .  .  Xdyot^  and  Xiystv  xal  rtecOscv,  recurring  at  the  close 
to  the  theme  of  the  little  speech.  Then  the  paronomasia  of 
iv  Sixaarrjpiui  Suaardq  xtX.,  and  the  allied  fi^ura  etymologica  in 
^prjixariar^':  .  .  .  ^prj/xart!^6fievo^,  with  the  anaphora  of  5o'bh>v,  as 
of  aiia  (D),  and  the  isokola  of  the  sentence.  The  word  douXov, 
with  its  semi-poetic  idea,  is  taken  directly  from  Gorgias  himself, 
for  Protarchus  (Phileb.  58  A)  has  often  heard  his  master  claim 
that  rhetoric  Tzavra  u<p^  aOr^  SoW.a  .  .  .  -koio'ito.  This  delicate 
epitome  of  style  closes  with  a  pathetic  apostrophe,  <roi  t<p  duvafiivm 
(cf.  Blass,  69).  Mark  also  the  unnecessary  fulness  of  expres- 
sion and  repetition  of  iv  ^uXloyu),  S-rrc^  ^uXloyoq  and  of  aXXot  xai  ou^ 
auTw,  adXa  aoi.    This  professional  padding  is  still  more  abundant 

'  Cf.  Philostratus,  Vit.  Soph.  p.  482K.  «  Cf.  1.  c.  p.  483K. 


in  the  longer  speech  (456  A-57  C),  where  indeed  it  is  the  chief 
peculiarity.  The  phrase  ou  del  Toh(;  diddaxovzai;  fitcstv  re  xa\  h.^dk- 
Xer^  Iz  Twv  noXswv  (6  E)  is  later  (7  B,  C)  twice  repeated  almost  word 
for  word  ;  so  rj  ^rjropui^  ^prjaOat  wantp  tt^  olXa-q  aytovia  (6  C)  recurs 
in  part  in  the  next  clause,  and  again  nearly  entire  (7  B)  ;  so  ob  toO- 
Too  iv£xa  (6  D)  ;  ipii>j-:ai  oux  dpewq  (7  A)  is  resumed  just  below  by  ol 
fiij  -/pM/xEvot  opOwi;;  rrsp)  otou — -niOavmrepov — iv  izhjdei  (6  C)  finds  its 
echo  in  niOaxoTspo^  .  ,  .  iv  toi?  TzkijOeaiv  nep)  8rou  (7  A) ;  kxelvot 
Ttapidouav  in\  ruT  Stxatox;  yrprjadat  (6  E)  appears  slightly  changed  in 
7  C.  The  a'j^r/iia  xar'  apaiv  xai  Oiaw  of  aixovoo'iivou^,  p.ij  uirdp^ovTag 
(7  A)  shows  the  same  tendency.  Besides  these  verbal  repeti- 
tions, the  thought,  which  one  sentence  would  have  expressed,  is 
repeated  positively  and  negatively  with  slight  variations  through- 
out the  speech.  Notice,  too,  the  rhetorical  and  emphatic  position 
of  the  adverb  Spff&q  at  the  close  of  the  sentence  (7  A  twice^,  of 
which  usage  in  Demosthenes  Rehdantz  gives  many  examples, 
and  to  which  Thucydides,  Gorgias'  pupil,  is  not  averse.'  Antitheses 
are  common,  though  inartistic,  and  are  expressed  by  aUo<:,  aXXd 
and  OUTS — OUTS.  This  speech  has  its  real  proem  in  455  D  and  E  f. 
This  same  fullness  of  expression  is  seen  in  occasional  peri- 
phrases, of  which  his  extant  speeches  afford  examples  (v.  Blass 
65).  So  the  partitives  eviai  rSiv  dTzuxpitrsw)/  (449  C)  and  ro  rcav 
TzapovTtuv  (458  B)  exemplify  a  usage,  which  another  pupil,  Isocrates, 
was  later  to  extend  and  mould  into  a  characteristic  formula.  The 
phrase  rob^  kdpiu^  TzoteiaOat  (449  C)  might  be  added,  though 
Socrates  has  it  as  well  (460  E),  and  ro  ri;^  Ti-/vTj^  (450  C)  also, 
where  they  are  perhaps  necessary  for  philosophic  exactitude  of 
definition.  However,  they  are  not  uncommon  periphrases,  and 
here  merely  show  a  general  tendency,  which  is  once  more  mani- 
fested in  the  addition  of  xa)  dtxattag  vTzokaji^dveiq  (451  E).  On  the 
other  hand,  a  careless  form  of  brachylogy  appears  in  kx  twv  (for 
zrjq  T&v)  drjixioupyuiv  (455  E).  We  know  from  Aristotle's  Rhetoric 
(189,  20  Rom.)  that  irony  was  a  characteristic  of  Gorgias,  though 
Aristotle  refers  it  to  the  use  of  poetic  ornament.  Blass  (63)  cites 
the  story  of  the  swallow.  In  our  dialogue  the  interposed  oliiai 
(460  A)  and  the  protest  to  Callicles  (497  B),  Travriu?  ou  aij  uuttj  jj 
7i;j.Tj,  show  this  feeling.  Some  consider  the  latter  phrase  to  be  a 
proverb,  but  its  application  would  show  irony  quite  as  well,  and 
it  is  doubtful  if  the  dignified  old  gentleman  would  descend  to  the 
vulgarity  of  a  proverb,  even  though  Protagoras  and  Hippias  do 

'v.  Classen:  Einleit.  79. 


use  a  few.  It  has  been  noted  •  that  the  Helen  has  very  few  par- 
ticles, hence  is  epideictic,  while  the  Palamedes  has  a  great 
variety  and  the  favorite  oratorical  combinations,  and  so  is  forensic. 
Here  only  two  places  can  fairly  be  called  speeches  by  Gorgias. 
The  former  (452  E),  a  declamatory  glorification  of  rhetoric,  has 
only  the  common  particles  xa\,  xairot,  aUd,  iilv  and  Si,  so  is 
epideictic,  as  its  more  artistic  form  and  ornament  would  lead  us 
to  expect.  The  latter  (456  A-7  C),  an  endeavor  to  prove  the 
power  of  the  art  by  instance  and  argument,  has  16  different  par- 
ticles and  combinations  of  particles,  hence  is  forensic.  In  the 
matter  of  oaths  a  quiet  vr^  Ji'a  or  fid  rdv  Ac'a  (448  A,  63  D,  73  A)  is 
all  that  the  two  sophists  use. 

The  periodology  of  Gorgias  is  very  simple,  and,  owing  to  the 
use  of  his  peculiar  figures,  is  dual,  antithetic,  and  composed  of 
short  kola.  Our  dialogue  shows  but  little  strong-  antithesis,  and 
the  duality  is  only  apparent  in  a  few  places.  The  best  cases  are 
452  E,  456  A-C,  and  456  DE  od3i  ys — TzoXewv.  Often  it  is  very 
simple,  but  a  more  complicated  arrangement  is  seen  in  (457  A)  of  Sk 
fiSTaiTTpi<pavT£<;  |  ^pcuvrat  tj  Iff^ot  |  xai  n'  ri^nTj  |  oux  opOax;,  where  the 
second  and  third  kola  are  parallel,  and,  less  clearly,  the  first  and 
fourth,  so  6-K6Tepov  (56  C),  <jpa<;  ore  (56  A)  ;  also  as  in  (452  E) 
xairot  iv  raorrj  tj  Suvd/x£t  |  dooXov  .  .  ,  iarpov  |  SouXov  .  .  ,  rtaiSo- 
zpi^fjv  II  J  ^e  .   .   .   oLtoi;  |  akXo)    .  ,  .  ^p-^fiart^^o/ievog  |  xai  ou^  aorat, 

where  in  each  period  the  second  and  third  kola  are  coordinate, 
but  together  parallel  to  the  first;  so  xai  si  (457 C).  The  only 
tricks  of  speech  which  are  not  used  bj'  master  or  pupil  are 
long  compounds,  bold  metaphors,  and  the  artistic  asyndeton, 
which  is  probably  intended  by  the  d-6(TTa(Ti<;  and  -poajioXij  of 
Philostratus.  Out  of  these,  however,  Callicles  employs  the  bold 
metaphors,  and  shows  some  asyndeton,  while  Socrates  has  one 
long  compound,  xaraipsudofiapTup-^Oeirj  (472  A),  which  may  parody 
this  trait  of  the  sophist. 

The  whole  delineation  of  Gorgias  is  marked  by  great  modera- 
tion, and  the  aged  Nestor  (Phaedr.  261  C)  is  treated  with  the 
utmost  respect  by  Socrates.  So  it  remains  for  his  younger  fol- 
lowers to  show  the  exaggeration  of  his  style  and  the  extension  of 
his  principles,  and  to  receive  the  brunt  of  the  attack.  He  is  said, 
on  reading  this  dialogue,  to  have  assured  his  friends,  rather  need- 
lessly, that  he  never  said  anything  of  the  sort,  to  have  exclaimed 
oji;xaX<u<:  nkdriov  olds  laiijiitieiv  (Athen.  XI  505),  and  to  have  styled 

*  JahrbUch.  f.  Philol.  103,  442. 


8 

him  a  new  Archilochus.  It  has  been  thought '  that  Aristophanes 
parodied  Gorgias  in  the  Birds,  while  he  attacked  him  indirectly 
by  the  caricature  of  his  pupil,  Agathon,  in  the  Thesmophoriazusae, 
but  in  neither  case  is  the  parody  as  apparent  as  here.  Besides 
the  famous  travesty  in  the  Symposium,  the  Menon,  a  sort  of  pre- 
lude to  the  great  tragedy,  begins  the  attack  through  the  pupil, 
who  voices  the  ideas  of  his  master "  and  stands  in  his  stead. 

POLUS. 

This  model  pupil  is  far  inferior  to  his  master  in  depth  of  mind, 
and  cannot  follow  the  course  of  dialectic,  but  must  be  repeatedly 
corrected  and  instructed.  He  disrespectfully  pushes  ahead  of 
Gorgias,  accuses  Socrates  of  ill-breeding,  and  is  altogether  rough, 
impetuous  and  arbitrary.  This  may  be  seen  by  such  expressions 
as  Tt'  Se  TOUTO,  idv  aoi  ys  [xavw^  (448  A),  aypoixia  (46I  C),  67:60^  av  ^ou- 
Xu)/iat  (D).  Impatience  is  shown  by  ipdOt  (462  D  twice)  and  xal 
Anoxptvai  (3  E),  and  conceit  by  aXridij  ye  ul6;x£vo^  (473  B).  The  short 
speech  448  C  is  an  excellent  example  of  exaggerated  Gorgiasm. 
The  paronomasia,  homoioteleuton,  isokolon,  and  allied  figures  are 
apparent  to  every  one.  The  word  al&va  affords  an  instance  of  the 
poetic  diction  with  which  Gorgias  embellished  his  writings,  and 
the  rare  use  of  nopsueaOac  seems  affected.  The  unusual  position 
of  the  vocative  at  the  head  of  the  sentence  may  impart  a  certain 
dignity.  Except  in  some  half-dozen  cases,  it  seems  to  open  in 
Plato  a  longer  and  more  formal  speech.  This  piece  is  regarded 
by  most  scholars  (after  Schol.  R.)  as  a  verbatim  extract  from 
Polus'  own  Ti-/vrj,  since  Socrates  mentions  (462  B)  having  read  the 
term  i/izscpta  in  that  book,  and  since  Hermogenes  cites  the  first 
part,  Aristotle  the  last,  as  Polus'.  However,  the  allusion  of 
Socrates  is  merely  to  the  one  word,  and  the  citation  of  Hermo- 
genes may  be,  as  Sittl  suggests,  from  this  very  place  in  Plato. 
Blass  thinks  that  only  the  first  sentence  is  an  extract,  while  the 
rest  is  in  the  idea,  but  not  the  form,  of  Polus.'  The  case  is  not 
so  certain,  then,  as  is  generally  considered,  and  it  seems  at  least 
quite  possible  that  the  fine  mimetic  artist  has  here  made  as  bold  a 
parody  of  Gorgianic  style  as  he  did  in  the  Symposium.  The 
comment  of  Olymp.,   6   Flwloq  B s  ar p  ixSx;  Tzpo^ipst  rov   Xoyov, 

'  Silvern  :  Ub.  Ar.  V6gel,  25-35,  47-55  (Av.  465-625,  1685  ;  Vesp,  419). 
'Meno,  71  D  to  72  A,  82  A ;  v.  Taine,  p.  180;  Schanz,  120  f. 
'P.  83  :  "was  Platon  ihn  .  .  .  weiter  sagen  lass/." 


seems  to  indicate  that  he  recognized  its  dramatic  nature.  As  an 
epideictic  speech,  it  shows  poverty  of  particles.  We  may  notice 
that  Hirzel  thinks  yufivdaiov  (493  D)  may  be  an  shovokoyia  (Phaedr. 
267  C)  from  the  above-mentioned  rixvi). 

His  abrupt  entree  (461  C)  presents  the  only  '  case  of  decided 
anacoluth  used  by  the  three  interlocutors,  who  thus  show  their 
careful  rhetorical  training  in  marked  contrast  to  the  conversational 
familiarity  of  Socrates.  Keck '  would  emend  away  this  case,  but 
it  is  clearly  due  to  the  excitement  and  impatience  seen  in  the 

hyperbaton  of  ayeiv  .  .  .  zohi;  koyouq  and  of  i^ij  in  lav  /xij  eXOrj  Taura 
eid(oq.  The  alliteration  d^anaq,  ooto?  dyayiuv  seems  almost 
too  striking  to  be  accidental.  Polus  followed  his  master  in  the 
study  of  Homer,  and  wrote  a  catalogue  of  the  ships  and  a  gene- 
alogy of  the  heroes  (Suidas),  so  the  word  ayirkia  (467  B)  and  the 
phrase  kx^^'s  '=«'  npwriv  (470  D  ;  cL  B  305)  may  be  epic  reminis- 
cences. The  irony,  which  Gorgias  shows  here  so  slightly,  is  very 
apparent  with  Polus  (v.  p.  10),  and  he  is  only  second  to  Socrates 
in  its  use.  A  second  characteristic  speech  is  given  471  A-C,  with 
its  pompous  prelude  in  470  D  (cf.  455  D),  which  calls  forth  the 
comment  of  Olympiodorus,  ^rjTopixw-epov  ixzidszai.  It  is  a  good 
instance  of  the  apodeictic  use  of  the  narrative,  and  its  abundant 
and  combined  particles  (as  hWd  /xkv  dij,  A,  and  roiydpToi  vuv,  C) 
witness  its  forensic  nature.  The  proem  is  A,  the  narrative  proper 
B  to  the  middle  of  C,  and  the  epilogue  the  remainder.  The 
speech  opens  with  a  rhetorical  question  (cf.  473  B),  an  artificial 
position,  which  is  avoided  by  the  most  effective  and  earnest 
orators.  Indeed,  this  figure,  so  abundant  in  the  Palamedes  of 
Gorgias,  is  such  a  pet  weakness  of  Polus  that  he  introduces  it 
twice  into  his  attempted  dialectic  (466A,  C),  and  Socrates  ridi- 
cules it  by  pretending  to  regard  it  the  opening  of  an  oration 
(jp6rriim  i^  Xoyou  ap^ijv,  1.  c).  The  Strong  and  vivid  terms,  xara- 
p.sOu(sa<;,  k/jt^a^u»,  iTziaipa^sv,  ijipdvtaev,  a-o-jzyt^a^,  as  the  accumulated 
tortures  in  473  B-C,  exemplify  au^rjirc?.  Cicero  (Brut.  47)  tells  us 
that  "rem  augere  laudando,  vituperandoadfligere  "  was  a  specialty 
of  Gorgias,  and   Olymp.  (on  473  C)  says  rd?  ffu/i^opd^  ao^wv 

»  Cron,  in  his  note  on  483  DE,  eiret  ttoi^  — romiiro  ^eyetv,  says  "  Das  zusam- 
menfassende  died  tritt  aus  der  Konstruktion,"  but  this  is  really  a  rhetorical 
aposiopesis.  Callicles  impatiently  cuts  short  the  proposed  arguments,  ttoIu — 
kaTparevaev  and  6  irar^p — ^Mar,  and  leaves  them  both  incomplete.  This  is 
lively,  but  artificial,  like  the  question  (toi^),  which  is  a  favorite  Gorgianic 
opening  (cf.  pp.  9,  12). 

'  JahrbUch.  f.  Philol.  83,  412. 


lO 

diyjyslrat.  Similarly  the  jerky  apposition  of  o{6v,  hve<in6v,  yjXutArrjv 
(B)  and  of  a8£k<p6v,  ul6v,  natda  (C),  as  Seanortjv  xal  Oslov  (A),  heap- 
ing one  relationship  upon  another,  with  the  three-fold  repetition 
of  'Aixz'TT]^  and  the  stem  of  5ouXoq  (A),  all  very  strongly  empha- 
size the  guilt  of  Archelaos.  The  bitter  irony  all  through  these 
speeches  (as  -j^als-Kmrspov,  tawi,  473  B ;  aOkmza-zo^,  Hirwi,  471  C)  also 
contributes  to  this  effect.  The  name  of  the  subject  of  the  eraii/o? 
is  artistically  made  the  last  word  of  the  speech,  as  both  Gorgias 
and  Isocrates  put  Helen's  name  in  the  last  sentence  of  their 
encomia.'  Finally  the  heaped-up  participles  denote  the  heaped- 
up  guilt,  though  they  mar  the  intended  apodeictic  force  of  the 
speech.'^  The  ratio  of  finite  verbs  in  the  narrative  is  13  to  8,  and, 
excepting  the  first  finite  verb,  we  have  a  curious  artistic  grouping : 

24         2424         2 
pp.  PPPP  I  f  f.  Pfpf  I  f  f.  PPPP  I  fp- 
The  verbs  of  473  B-C  show  like  symmetry: 

22323      2X3  2 

pf  I  pp,  f  ff  I  pp,  fff  I  pf,  pf,  pf  I  pp. 

The  quieter  proem  (471  A)  has  the  opposite  ratio,  i  to  8,  while 
the  epilogue  shows  a  more  even  balance.  The  little  speech 
(473  B-C)  has  its  proportionately  short  proem  and  epilogue,  ^rui? 
Uyeii ;  and  rauza  Xiysis  xtX.  The  fullness  of  expression  seen  in 
Gorgias  is  found  in  the  pleonasm  apTt,  roumu  Tzpi'mOsv  (467  B). 
One  of  Gorgias'  precepts  was  el  6  Ivavrio^  anoudala  liy^t,  yiXa  xa\ 
k'xxfxius  wni'iM  (Olymp.),  and  so  Polus  employs  this  device  of  his 
master  (473  E). 

Teichmiiller '  notes  that  Polus  uses  the  answer  rai?  yap  ou  ;  five 
times  in  475  B-8  C,  and  suggests  that  it  may  represent  the  Thes- 
salian  culture  of  Gorgias'  school.  Callicles  uses  it  seven  times, 
Gorgias  three.  Socrates  has  it  twice,  but  it  may  be  a  mocking 
echo  of  the  sophists.  Moreover,  it  is  twice  employed  by  the 
imaginary  objectors  introduced  by  Socrates,  who  must  be  counted 
as  a  part  of  the  outside  world.  Excluding  Socrates,  the  total  is 
.14S  to  the  page.  In  order  to  see  how  far  this  form  of  answer  is 
sophistic  in  its  tendency,  all  the  dialogues  of  Plato  have  been 
examined,  and  the  cognate  forms  jtcS?  d'  ou ;  and  ::u»?  yap  av ;  also 

«  Cf.  Isaeus  5,  Lys.  26 — near  the  end — Lye,  Dem.  23,  Thuc.  I  43,  VI  87,  etc. 
'v.  Am.  Journ.  Philol.  IX  146. 
'  Literarische  Fehden,  II  321. 


II 

noted.  It  does  not  appear  in  the  Apol.,  Tim.,  Criti.,  Symp.,  Prot., 
lo,  and  Menex.  Socrates  uses  it  once  in  the  Euthyd.  and  Crat., 
twice  in  the  Gorg.,  and  thrice  in  the  Rep.  Four  persons  use  it 
more  often  than  .10  to  the  Teubner  page  :  (i)  Theaetetus  in  the 
Soph.  (.23;  wtS?  it'  ou ;  .14);  (2)  Thrasymachus  in  the  Repub.  I 
(.21;  for  actual  participation,  .32);  (3)  Protarchus  in  the  Phileb. 
(.16),  and  (4)  Aristotle  in  the  Parm.  (.124  ;  for  actual  participa- 
tion, .16J).  The  first  was  a  disciple  of  Theodorus,  and  he  of 
Protagoras,  the  second  (Phil.  58  A)  and  third  either  pupils  of,  or 
strongly  influenced  by,  Gorgias,  while  of  the  last  we  only  know 
that  he  was  one  of  the  Thirty.  Three  of  these,  then,  point  clearly 
to  sophistic  influence,  while  the  fourth,  being  otherwise  unknown, 
and  appearing  in  a  dialogue  of  doubtful  genuineness,  renders  testi- 
mony neither  pro  nor  con.  Though  the  Thessalian  theory  of 
Teichmiiller  finds  no  support,  we  infer  that  this  answer  in  the 
Gorgias  may  be  one  of  the  finer  mimetic  touches  of  our  author. 
Lysis  (.16S)  and  Alcibiades  in  Ale.  I  (.20)  have  been  excluded, 
the  former  dialogue  being  too  short,  the  latter  spurious. 

POLUS  AND  CaLLICLES. 

These  two  pupils  of  Gorgias  exhibit  interesting  diflferences  and 
similarities  of  language  and  demeanor,  and  some  of  the  more 
important  cases  may  be  briefly  noticed.  At  their  entree  each  has 
the  same  idea  in  his  mind,  but  Polus  is  rough  and  excited  (461  B, 
cf.  p.  9),  while  Callicles  politely  turns  to  Chaerephon  first,  and  is 
cool  and  calm  to  Socrates  (481  BC).  Accordingly,  Polus  receives 
no  explanation  and  is  silenced  with  little  ceremony,  but  Callicles 
is  allowed  to  make  a  long  speech,  after  Socrates  has  graciously 
explained  his  position.  Both  accuse  the  philosopher  of  trickery 
(461  C,  ei?  rucaura  ayeiv  ;  482  E,  et?  roiadra  aysit;'),  and  depreciate 
Gorgias  with  the  same  phrases  (461  B,  f^a^oyOyj — ivavria  Xiyetv — 
8  Jij  ayana^  •  482  D,  alff^u^d^vat — cvoKTi'a  slizelv — as:  Se  touto  ayaixav). 
Polus  attempts  dialectic,  of  which  he  is  clearly  incapable,  and 
begins  before  he  knows  Socrates'  position,  while  Callicles  makes 
a  long  and  able  speech,  after  ascertaining  his  opponent's  views. 
The  former  starts  too  soon  and  is  at  once  interrupted,  the  latter 
waits  till  the  proper  time.  Polus  advocates  the  right  of  the 
stronger  in  crude  and  revolting  language  (466  C,  471  A-C,  cf.  p.  9, 
473  B  arptpXwrai,  xazaTimtudrj  xrX.'),  and  uses  a  coarse  barbarian  as 
an  example,  Callicles  in  specious  terms  {<fO(fi%  vs.  v6ixoz)  and  poetic 
phrases  {avstpdvTi,  i^ikaiiipev),  and  cites    Pindar    and  Euripides 


12 

(482  A-486  D).  The  answers  of  Socrates  indicate  the  contrast, 
/io/>fxoXijTrsc  al)  (473  E)  tO  the  One,  si  ^joou^v  e/tuv  ,  ,  .  r^v  <pu'/[rj^ 
(486  D)  to  the  other.  Polus  uses  the  wrong  verb,  'Ap^iXaov  6pai 
(470  D),  Callicles  the  right  one,  de;u<rToxXia  dxouen ;  (503  C). 
Both  allude  to  the  many  possible  examples  (470  D,  oddsv .  .  ,  8et 

-aXatinq  TzpiiyixafTiv  :  483  DE,  (iXXa  jiupia  d'lT!?  iyiii  Xiyeiv),  but  one 
dwells  on  his  tyrant's  crimes,  the  other  passes  quickly  from  Xerxes 
to  the  more  distant  Darius.  Both  begin  with  a  rhetorical  question 
(471  A,  473  B  ;  491  E),  but  Callicles  answers  Socrates  first ;  both 
treat  their  opponent  with  scorn  (470  C,  491  E,  495  D),  and  show 
great  confidence  (473  B,  474  B ;  488  D,  495  C),  though  the  general 
tone  of  Callicles  is  firmer  (-«yo  a<p6Spa  'dXsyov,  iydt  (toi  o-a^o)?  Xiyw). 
Both  use  the  rediccHo  ad  absurdum  (473  E,  cf.  474  B :  481  C),  and 
both  show  embarrassment :  Socrates  twice  asks  Polus  ri  oux 
ar.iixpvjsi ;  (468  D,  cf.  474  C,  D  3  times),  and  says  dnoxpiyou  (515  C, 
cf.  509  E)  to  Callicles  after  three  unanswered  queries,  and  finally 
has  to  answer  himself.  For  similar  expressions  cf.  466  A,  Socr. 
to  Polus,  rrjXixouro^  aiv  (defensive),  and  489  B,  Callicles  to  Socr., 
id.  (ofTensive) :  468  E  and  499  B,  w?  Srj  ah:  471  E,  Soxet  mi  wi 

Xiyoi,  and  495  B,  xm  yap  ai> ;  473  C,  dia<poy(bv  Tupavvo?  xaradrr,  and 
484  A,  Sca^uywv  ,  .  .  metpdyiq  dsdTtozrj^ :  473  A,  arona  iTztyscpsli;  (cf. 
480  E),  and  aroro?  el,  494  D ;  467  B  and  489  B,  uuTo^(^r)  d.n^p — 
tT/JzX'.a  Xiyn?  and  oo  -Kaixit-ai  <pXuapmv.  Socrates  uses  irony  only 
playfully  with  Polus,  and  attacks  personal  weaknesses  (461  B, 
470  D),  but  very  keenly  with  Callicles  to  combat  logical  errors 
(as  490  C-E,  494  C-E).  He  gives  each  two  examples,  to  Polus 
prosaic  incidents  in  his  own  life  (469  D,  474  A),  to  Callicles  poetic 
myths  from  the  philosophers  (492E-4A). 

Callicles. 

As  Gorgias  represents  the  theory  of  rhetoric,  and  Polus  its 
technique,  so  Callicles  its  practical  application ;  or,  as  Jahn  puts 
it,  Gorgias  is  positive.  Polos  comparative,  Callicles  superlative. 
He  is,  as  already  shown,  quite  the  most  skilled  antagonist  of  the 
three  in  logical  thought  and  energetic  expression,  and  he  exceeds 
in  the  length  of  his  main  speech  any  Platonic  interlocutor,  except- 
ing Protagoras  and  the  speakers  of  the  Symposium  and  Republic. 
His  independence  of  action  is  shown  by  his  frequent  attacks 
upon  Socrates  (489  B,  E,  490DE,  97  A,  505  D,  511  A,  15  B,  21  B), 
his  sophistic  changing  of  ground  (489  C,  91  A,  99  B),  his  frequently 


13 

restricted  assent  (495  A,  501  D,  13  E,  14  A,  i6B,D)  and  his 
refusal  to  continue  the  discussion  C505D).  Olymp.  compares 
him  to  Sisyphus,  who  pushes  forward  the  stone  and  then  draws 
back.  He  might  have  added  that  it  is  the  overpowering  weight 
of  the  Socratic  elenchus  which  compels  Callicles  to  retreat.  He 
is  clearly  none  of  those  lay-figures  which  appear  so  universally 
in  the  Platonic  dialogues. 

The  rhetorical  influence  of  Gorgias  appears  in  the  artistic  asso- 
nance, iTraivooi}  knaivobaiv  xai  <pdyou^  ^'iyooaiv  (483  B)  ^ekrio\i6<;  ts 
xai  xpiiTTuvoi  ,  ,  .  ^sipovtov  re  xai  ijTrovutv  (484  C),  vofiov  re  xai  Xoyov 
xai  tpdyov  (492  B), '£<rra*  tooto  oorm  (504A);  in  the  bold  meta- 
phors, diapprj^af  .  . .  xara^zan^trai  . . .  ^EffTrdny?  .  .  .  i^iXaix4>tv  (484  A), 
jT/larTHyTe? (483  E) ,  <JUiii:i>Si<T0si<s,  iT:s<TTtifi.{<Tdyj  (482  E),  noppw  ftXoao^iaf 
iXauvovra?  (486  A),  and  similes  (483  E,  99  B) :  in  the  rhetorical 
questions  (491  E,  2B,C),  and  the  alliteration  -eiOou,  xadaai  .  .  . 
7rpayp.dTwv  (486  C).  Under  this  head  may  be  classed  the  cases  of 
hyperbole  (/lupt'a  483  D)  and  catachresis  (/St'o?  486  D).  The 
sophistic  criticism  and  adaptation  of  the  poets  is  seen  in  quota- 
tions from  Homer  and  Pindar,  but  especially  from  the  rhetorical 
Euripides,  selections  from  one  of  whose  prjaeti  are  skilfully  woven 
into  Callicles'  own  argument  (485  E,  86  BC).  Though  thus 
dependent  on  Gorgias,  he  is  also  a  man  of  the  world,  and 
approaches  to  the  simpler  style  of  Socrates  in  his  litotes  (513  C), 
slight  cacophony  (^tyw  Xiyw  484  B),  careless  hyperbaton,  ipuatv 
.  .  .  yexvaiav  (485  E),  his  use  of  proverbs  (447  A,  505  C,  21  B) 
and ^g-ura  etymologica  (8).  Here  also  may  be  placed  his  asyn- 
deton (483  C,  E,  484  A,  489  B),  though,  as  we  have  seen  (p.  7), 
a  more  artistic  form  might  be  ascribed  to  the  contact  with  Gorgias. 
The  massing  of  four  (483  E)  and  six  (84  A)  participles  at  the  most 
brilliant  part  of  his  long  speech,  crowded  as  it  is  with  poetic 
tropes  and  bitter  scorn,  reminds  us  of  the  exploits  of  his  prede- 
cessors. At  458  C,  Schol.  O.  notes  that  Chaerephon  desires  the 
continuation  of  the  discussion,  because  it  is  profitable  (jtpitopytai- 
Tspov),  but  Callicles,  because  it  is  pleasant  (^ffOr/n).  So  he  says 
intOu/xsl  lujxpdTTjz  (447  B),  but  the  latter  answers  jSouXofiat  (Olymp.). 

The  fact  that  our  knowledge  of  Callicles  is  limited  to  this  dia- 
logue has  caused  various  speculations  upon  his  identity.  That 
Plato  has  been  considered  not  averse  to  the  employment  of  pseu- 
donyms may  be  seen  in  Teichmiilier's '  identification  of  Lysias 
with  Dionysodorus,  a  character  whose  reality  Grote  and  Schaar- 

'  Literarische  Fehden,  I  30  ff. 


14 

Schmidt  had  already  doubted.  Indeed,  Cicero  (Leg.  1 15)  thought 
that  the  ?=>»?  of  the  Laws  was  Plato  himself,  and  the  Eleatic 
strangers  in  the  Sophistes  and  Politicus  are  certainly  shadowy 
characters.  Steinhart  and  Stallbaum  consider  Callicles  a  typical 
Athenian  of  his  time,  and  van  Prinsterer  treats  him  as  historical, 
while  Benard  expresses  doubts  as  to  his  real  existence.  Gotschlich 
held  that  he  represents  Isocrates,  not  in  traits  of  character  so 
much  as  in  the  expression  of  Isocrates'  views,  while  he  is  forced 
to  draw  conclusions  which  the  orator  would  never  draw.  How- 
ever, this  is  even  more  true  of  his  relation  to  Gorgias,  and  he 
could  only  in  a  very  general  way  represent  iwo  people.  Schmelzer 
has  a  curious  theory  that  the  three  interlocutors  are  the  three 
accusers  of  Socrates,  Gorgias  being  Lykon,  Polus  Meletus,  and 
Callicles  Anytus.  He  bases  it  chiefly  on  certain  correspondences 
in  the  last  pair,  which  he  sets  forth  at  the  end  of  his  Gorgias  and 
in  his  Menon  (pp.  50,  52,  58,  60,  62).  They  are  both  wily  poli- 
ticians and  easily  angered,  alike  condemn  the  sophists  and  warn 
Socrates  of  his  fate ;  but  Callicles  is  friendly,  an  aristocrat  and 
cultured,  while  Anytus  is  hostile,  low-born  and  ignorant.  More- 
over, Callicles  calls  the  accuser  of  Socrates  Ttdw  [lo-j^dtjpdi;  xal 
<pt>uXo^  (521  C).  The  most  plausible  view,  which  identified  him 
with  Critias,  was  proposed  by  Cron  in  his  Beitrage  (1870),  but  he 
abandoned  it  in  1886,  apparently  under  the  criticism  of  Bonitz.' 
The  similarity  is,  however,  so  very  strong  that  it  deserves  notice. 
Jowett  (11  275)  remarks,  "  had  his  name  been  Critias  instead  of 
Callicles,  his  opinions  would  seem  to  reflect  his  life,"  and  K.  O. 
Miiller,  Zeller,  Blass  and  others  class  their  views  together,  making 
them  with  Thrasymachus  a  trio  of  sceptics.  This  collocation  is 
as  old  as  Themistius  (Or.  26  fin.),  and  Olymp.  often  notices  the 
connection  with  Thrasymachus.  This  even  extends  to  language, 
such  expressions  as  xaxoupysl's  iv  rot?  A6yo(?  and  r^doi;  el,  beside  TrtSy 
yap  ov ;  above  noted,  being  common  to  both,  while  they  uphold 
the  right  of  the  stronger  in  like  terms  (483  B,  Rep.  338  E).  All 
three  came  under  the  instruction,  or  direct  influence,  of  Gorgias. 
To  the  striking  points  of  likeness  adduced  by  Cron  a  few  others 
may  be  added.  Callicles  is  contradictory  and  changeable  in  his 
opinions  (p.  14)  and  in  his  public  life  (481  E),  a  character  quite 
like  that  of  Critias  (Cron  19).  The  defense  of  nXeovsxrsiv  (Cron 
17)  is  also  seen  in  Xen.  Hellen.  (II  3,  16),  where  Critias  joins 

'  Jahrb.  f.  Philol.  133,  579.     Now  (141,  253)  he  calls  Callicles'  speech  an  ecAtt 
of  what  Plato  had  heard  Critias  say. 


IS 

nXiov  s^scv  and  ap^ij  as  Callicles  here  (483  D).  In  dialectic  both 
change  ground  and  withdraw  their  statements  (Char.  164  D, 
165  B),  and  object  to  Socrates'  method  of  treatment  (Char.  165  E, 
166;  Gorg.  497  A,  511).  Very  little  is  known  of  Critias'  style, 
and  only  scanty  fragments  of  his  works  remain.  A  certain  simi- 
larity of  idea  is  seen  in  the  metaphor  of  Callicles,  ouiir.odiaeei^  Iv 
ToXi;  koyoi?  .  .  .  al(T^u\/dsi?  (482  E)  and  the  line  aidou?  a-^a\y.tl)Tin(!iv 
eUoxrac  TziSaiq  (598  N.),  from  the  Peirithous,  which  K.  O.  Miiller 
and  others  ascribe  to  Critias.  Callicles'  approval  of  Alcibiades 
and  Cimon  was  shared  by  Critias  (Eleg.  3-5,  Hist.  9).  The  fact 
that  (peuSotidpru!;  (472  B)  only  occurs  (until  Plutarch)  in  Critias 
(Trag.  9  N.)  and  in  472  B,  is  probably  a  mere  coincidence,  unless 
Socrates  intends  it  to  be  a  compliment  to  the  poet. 

Chaerephon. 

Olympiodorus  devotes  especial  notice  to  the  position  and  func- 
tions of  Chaerephon.  He  says  that  he  is  opdudo^o^,  and  is  used 
by  Socrates  as  an  example  of  ~u>i;  lirttrTij/iovei  yhovrai  xai  SiaXiyo-yrac, 
but  is  not  essential  to  the  discussion.  He  is,  moreover,  a  medium 
between  the  two  sides,  diam)/>0/j.su£[,  and  so,  having  had  a  previous 
acquaintance  and  rencontre  with  Gorgias  (p.  5),  he  questions  him 
in  the  place  of  Socrates  (447  C).  He  uses  a  proverb,  ^yw  xai 
Idaoixai  (448  B),  to  match  the  preceding,  as  Socrates  had  matched 
the  proverb  of  Callicles,  and  turns  the  latter's  own  phrase,  oidkv 
inov  TO  auToy  Iptordj  (447  C),  into  an  answer  to  the  host  himself 
(481  B).  So  Socrates  (p.  18)  in  his  replies  embodies  the  phrases 
of  his  opponents.  In  fact,  as  in  Aristophanes'  Clouds,  he  is  the 
model  Socratic  pupil,  and  is  the  counterpart  of  Polus.  He  is 
more  respectful  to  his  master,  and  shows  his  skill  in  understand- 
ing Socrates  by  one  example,  while  Polus  needs  many,  and  even 
Gorgias  two  (449  D).  A  touch  of  his  master's  irony  appears  in 
^aSitoq  uKoxpf^st  (448  A),  and  he  addresses  6oik  Gorgias  and 
Socrates  (458  C),  though  the  latter  wished  to  continue  the  conversa- 
tion. In  458  C  he  may  have  had  in  mind  the  line  of  Pindar,  da-/o/.[ag 
b-izipTspov  Kpayiia,  which  was  probably  a  favorite  quotation  of 
Socrates  (v.  Phaedr.  227  B).  Here  we  may  also  note  his  figura 
etymologica  (458  C,  448  C),  which,  considering  the  small  part  that 
he  takes,  is  a  large  proportion.  In  the  opening  of  the  Charmides 
he  justifies  the  epithet  of /^ai-tzo?,  as  his  subordinate  position  here 
does  not  allow  him  to  do,  and  he  occupies  a  like  intermediate  and 
introductory  position. 


i6 

Socrates. 
I. — His  Personality. 

In  approaching  the  character  of  Socrates  we  are  at  once  con- 
fronted by  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  the  peculiarities  of  the 
author  in  language  and  thought  from  those  of  his  master.  While 
Xenophon  and  Aristotle  may  help  us  to  extract  the  thought, 
they  leave  us  for  the  most  part  unaided  in  our  study  of  the  lan- 
guage. We  might  look  to  the  Clouds  of  Aristophanes,  but  there 
the  parody  seems  to  be  confined  to  method  and  doctrines.  Those 
figures  and  modes  of  expression  which  occur  throughout  the 
Socratic  dialogues  (as  given  by  Zeller),  and  which  agree  with  our 
knowledge  of  the  character  of  Socrates,  mjiy  with  a  good  degree 
of  certainty  be  considered  dramatic  reproductions  of  reality. 

The  most  prominent  and  characteristic  of  these  is  the  irony, 
demanded  by  the  special  earnestness,  plain  speaking  and  hard 
hitting  of  the  philosopher.  To  cite  all  the  cases  in  the  Gorgias 
would  be  to  transcribe  half  the  dialogue.  It  is  sometimes  quite 
apparent,  often  keen  and  subtle,  now  a  polite  veil  for  dissent,  now 
a  powerful  engine  of  destructive  criticism.  Perhaps  the  most 
pungent  examples  are  the  retorts  to  Polus,  akka  roi  i^e::iTTj8ei  xzX. 
(461  C),  and  akk'  axDuo)  ys  (470  D).  Closely  akin  to  this  is  litotes, 
which  is  well  suited  to  the  mock  modesty  of  the  philosopher. 
Whether  it  carries  a  positive  meaning  directly  and  clearly,  or 
makes  simply  a  qualified  statement,  its  form  at  least  seems  more 
modest.  It  is  most  frequent  in  Xenophon  and  Plato,  and  this 
may  be  due  to  the  influence  of  their  common  master.  Four  of 
the  five  cases  of  w  Tzdvu  are  used  by  Socrates,  as  is  also  oox  ^kiyrj^ 
(461  B).  So  playful  and  genial  does  he  always  seem  that  we  are 
justified  in  considering  peculiar  to  himself  the  occasional  play 
upon  words,  as  the  two  ^^^"((481  E,  cf  513B),  Ivavrwv  and  ivavrta 
(487  B),  kdyou  and  koptv  (523  A),''AtS(iu  and  dstdii  (493  B).  ntOov, 
a;wijTou?  and  aw/ia  are  borrowed  (493  A).  This  sportive  fancy 
is  exemplified  also  in  pompous  legal  expressions  like  Kakkuk^i  6 
'A^^apvsb?  sffj  (495  D),  ra  //.iv  akka  xaOaTzsp  (51  B),  ffw/^^?'ij^<'9  (S^O  A, 
cf  501  C),  506  C,  and  in  the  mock  solemnity  of  the  patronymic 
c!  A'/iijvt'sco?  (482  A).  So  is  the  use  of  antonomasia  (482  B),  and 
oxymoron,  Scd  rd  aia-j^msaOai.  Tnkii.a  (487  B).  In  this  same  familiar 
tone  are  used  the  proverbs.  Dorian  in  their  character  and  origin, 
as  is  seen  by  their  frequency  in  Epicharmus  and  Sophron  (Plato's 
models)  and  by  the  gnomic  trend  of  Doric  thought,  they  were 


»7 

approved  and  studied  by  Aristotle,  but  considered  vulgar  and  old- 
fashioned  by  Isocrates.  In  Plato  they  are  most  abundant  in  the 
Lys.,  Charm.,  Euthyd.,  Symp.  and  Phaedr.,  all  dramatic  and 
familiar  in  tone ;  then  in  the  Theaetetus  and  Phil.,  then  in  the 
Gorgias  and  Laws,  the  first  three  blending  the  serious  with  the 
dramatic,  the  last  counteracting  its  stiffness  by  a  strong  Doric 
color;  and  finally  in  Euth'o,  Phaedo  and  Repub.,  where  the 
elevation  of  tone  somewhat  overrides  dramatic  tendencies.  Out 
of  274  occurrences  of  188  proverbs,  144  are  put  in  the  mouth  of 
Socrates,  56  are  used  by  his  interlocutors,  and  74  appear  in  Leg., 
Soph,  and  Polit.,  where  he  does  not  participate.  In  the  Gorgias, 
Socrates  employs  13,  a  number  slightly  below  his  ratio,  and 
Chaerephon  one,  while  the  two  sophists  do  not  stoop  at  all  to  such 
vulgarity  (v.  p.  6).  Callicles  again  shows  his  neutrality  by  using 
three,  slightly  more  than  his  share. 

Likewise  familiar  and  old-fashioned  is  the  figura  eiymologica, 
which  Isocrates  seems  consequently  to  avoid.  Dionysius  (De 
Admir.  Vi,  27),  in  his  critique  of  the  Menexenus,  recognizes  the 
vulgarity  of  the  figure,  saying  «tiz  olba  el  rt?  av  ii^iwasv  siTzslw  r&v 
TTjv  Af-TTji/  xai  dxptjS^  xai  xaOapdv  SidXexzov  i-crr/SsuovTiu)/'  -pdzTsrat 
yap  rd  Tzpdy/xara,  ipydt^trai.  ds  rd  epya.  Kiihner '  thinks  that  the 
more  pleonastic  forms  (as  ohiav  olxoSotielv')  have  been  taken  into 
literary  language  from  popular  speech.  In  studying  the  use  of 
this  figure  in  Plato  we  must  recognize  a  "doubtful  "  class,  consist- 
ing of  the  combination  of  a  participle  and  verb  (as  6  -oiwv  -otsi 
and  rrojsfv  to  Tzoioup.evu-^')  and  the  use  with  a  neuter  relative  (as 
Tzou'i.  %  TtouX),  which  are  deliberate  and  more  exact  forms  of  speech, 
and  serve  the  needs  of  philosophic  definition.  The  phrase  <«? 
em<y  e^;r£?i'  has  been  excluded,  as  being  too  common  to  give  color. 
All  kinds  are  found  in  the  Gorgias,  cases  where  the  noun  is 
in  the  nomin.,  accus.,  dat.,  and  even  genitive  absolute  (458  C, 
513  C),  and  where  the  relative  takes  the  place  of  the  noun. 
Socrates  employs  75  (87  per  cent),  or,  excluding  the  doubtful 
class,  53  (46  per  cent).  This  indicates  that  he  owes  his  large 
proportion  mainly  to  the  use  of  definition  and  to  exactness  of 
speech.  Chaerephon  has  it  twice,  the  sophists  more  sparingly 
(one  each),  and  Callicles  less  than  his  share  (8).  In  seven 
Socratic '  dialogues  (322  pp.)  the  ratio  per  page  is  .59,  without 
the  doubtful,  .36,  of  which  Socrates  has  .47  and  .26,  while  in  four 

•  Griech.  Grammatik,  1086,  2. 

*  Frot.,  Lach.,  Euth'o,  Gorg.,  Crito,  Lys.,  Meno. 


i8 

late '  dialogues  (320  pp.)  it  is  .49  and  .34.  This  inconveniently 
large  proportion  in  the  late  dialogues  is  mainly  due  to  the  Laws, 
where  the  exact  legal  tone  and  a  certain  rejuvenescence  of 
dramatic  art  at  the  beginning  may  be  responsible.  Out  of  the 
dialogues  examined,  the  largest  proportion  is  in  the  Crito,  then 
Laws  XL  then  Gorgias.  In  the  Symposium  Socrates  has  36  per 
cent  and  14  per  cent  of  the  whole  number,  and  Pausanias  alone 
approaches  him  with  18  per  cent  and  14  per  cent.  Here  the 
philosopher  only  exceeds  the  sophist  by  the  use  of  definition. 
Its  frequency  in  the  Memorabilia  (48  and  34  cases)  seems  to  show 
that  it  wasdi  favorite  usage  of  Socrates,  while  the  statistics  from  Plato 
indicate  that  the  latter  became  scarcely  less  devoted  to  it  than  his 
master. 

One  of  the  most  striking  idiosyncrasies  of  Socrates  is  his  great 
fondness  for  oaths.'  Two  forms  seem  to  have  been  his  favorites  : 
vij  rr/v'Hpav  (449  D),  which  is  properly  a  woman's  oath,  is  found 
in  Xenophon  as  well,  and  Professor  Gildersleeve  has  suggested 
that  he  borrowed  from  his  mother,  together  with  her  maieutic 
art,  of  which  Hera,  through  her  daughter  Eilethyia,  was  patron. 
It  is  also  used  by  others.'  The  second,  the  famous  Rhadaman- 
thine  v-^  (fj-a)  rdv  xuva  (46 1  B,  66  C)  is  due  to  the  euphemism,  which 
goes  a  step  further  in  the  elliptic  /xa  t6v  (466  E),  and  is  explained 
(482  B)  by  the  addition  rdv  Alyu7:Tcu}v  8edv  (Anubis).  Beside  the 
above,  we  have  r/x)?  Jto?,  <ptXiou,  dswv;  vai  Qxa)  Aia,  and  the  jest- 
ing iJ-a  ruv  ZrjOov  (489  E).  The  free  use  of  interjections  also  bears 
witness  to  his  lively  and  easy  style.  He  cries  out  iou,  uiu  (499  C, 
cf  Rep.  432  D).  Just  two-thirds  of  the  (18)  interjections  in  Plato 
( Ast)  are  uttered  by  Socrates,  /JaySai'  being  the  favorite  (7).  Others 
use  the  same  words.  The  skilful  dialectician  often  repeats  the 
phrases  of  his  opponents  in  his  own  arguments,  turning  their 
sharpest  weapons  against  his  foes.     (462  B)  i/mstpia  from  448  C, 

(475  D)  OTTO  Ttokkmv  avOpm-ur^  from  474  B,  (506  C)  ourw?  avrfp  from 
489  B,  (518  A)    a'^s?.suOip<iu<s,   douhmpsTret?,    485  B,    (526  E)   dvstSt- 

Z<u  (Tot  xtL,  answers  486  A-C;  avrcTcapaxaXw  answers  485  E  and 
521  A;  (527  D)  vswHsusaOai  answers  482  C,  and  6i:oXov  doxig  xrX. 
answers  466  C  fT.  With  like  droTzia  (Symp.  215  A),  he  ironically 
quotes  their  statements.  (460  A)  w(n:ep  cTrs?,  a-KoxaXixI'a'i  (455  D), 
(462  E,  509  A),  dypouoTepov  (46 1  C),  (506  B)  tijv  'A[i^iuvu^  pr^atv  from 

1  Soph.,  Pol.,  Criti.,  Leg.  I-III,  XI. 
2v.  Schanz,  Nov.  Comm.  Plat.  i8  ff. 
*Xen.  Conv.  3  times,  Lach.  181  A,  etc. 


19 

485  E,  (519  D)  lot  dXrjdai?  di^iitjYope'iv  from  482  C.  This  is  really  a 
sort  of  parody  in  a  parody,  which  is  still  more  evident  in  the 
assonance  of  (461  D)  iv  epyotg  xai  iv  ^.dyot?,  (465  D)  woAy  .  .  . 
nSike,  (467  B)  to  XuiaTe  IlwXe,  (461  C)  a)  xdXkt<TTs.  JlcoXs. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  in  the  language  of  all  the  other 
interlocutors  there  is  but  one  case  of  anacoluth  (p.  9).  The  speeches 
of  Socrates,  on  the  contrary,  exhibit  a  very  loose  and  careless 
style,  which  imitates  the  structure  of  easy  conversation.  We 
know  that  the  philosopher  disregarded  the  mere  externals  of  lan- 
guage and  system,  and  indeed  he  says  himself  (Symp.  199  B) 
that  he  speaks  Svdfiaat  Si  xal  Oiffsi  firj/MTutv  Tocaurtj,  dizoia  d'  av  ti? 
rbx^lj  iT^^Xdouaa.  This  shows  itself  in  loose,  disjointed  sentences 
like  459  E,  465  D,  493  AB,  501  A,  505  D  kTztdivra^,  507  DE, 
508  CD,  511  DE,  512  Ef.,  513  D,  17  E,  21  E,  and  in  genuine 
anacoluths,  453  AB  ^j-w  .  .  .  iid,  477  D(?),  454  B  "va/i^  <?au;uoCjj?, 
464  A,  503  D  Touzo  dk  riyjvrj  xzX,,  515  D  oux  law?,  dXX'  dvdfxyj.;  517  D 
ehac  .  .  .  TOiodrov  ovra,  521  A  dtaxovijffovra  ;"  also  in  the  repetition 
of  a  word,  as  5ianpaTTo;iivrj  (511  'D'),T:apiXa^£  (516  B),  in  self-inter- 
ruption  (500 E),  and  in  hyperbaton,  (rdftaTt  rw..  .  .  ytyvoixivut 
(504  C),  and  StaXiyeadat  .  .  .  r/jo?  aXXrjXou?  (473  C).  Here  we 
may  class  the  frequent  brachylogy,as  tj  vuv  <  ^zw  rr^v  vuv  Xiyovziy- 
f 493  D),  avso  •<  TOO  (ppovri^eiv  >•  roD  ^sXziarov  (465  A),  itivovTsq  Tzapd 
for  TO  dcd6;x£vov  vtzu  (467  C),  dvTi  yecpovwv  for  rod  Tzou'iv  'j/ttpwai; 
(515  D,  cf.  516  C),  and  asyndeton,  455  B  orav,  464  B  Suo'tv  and  rr/v 
[li'-i,  472  A  fiapzupijaouat,  481  E  ev  te  ixxXrjma,  487  B  rive  ;  also  the 
awkward  assonance  or  cacophony,  as  o5  oorot  (451  D),  kyco  ipS> 
C453D,  504  C),  iym  Xiyw  (^-joE,  512  D,  518  A,  22C),4'iYw  iycb 
(517  B),  iyu)  ayw  (494  E),  tI  5k  toSs;  (474  D).  Pleonasm  and 
polysyndeton  are  much  rarer,  as  (480  E)  rouvavriov  ao  pLSTafiaXovra, 
(482  B)  xpslTTov  ,  ,  .  jxaXXov,  (453  B)  bnoitTEuw  rjv  oljiat  (modesty), 
and  (519  A)  xal  Xt/xivtuv  xzX. 

Gathering  from  various  indices  166  cases  of  anacoluth,  in 
dialogues  where  Socrates  participates,  and  39  of  brachylogy,  he  is 
found  to  have  84  per  cent  of  each.  Of  course,  these  figures  only 
show  a  general  tendency,  since  they  do  not  present  all  the  cases, 
nor  do  we  know  Socrates'  exact  ratio  in  the  other  dialogues. 
This  same  carelessness  of  speech  may  be  seen  in  the  Memora- 
bilia, as  dpyt^sffdat  .  .  .  Xurel  (III  13,  i),  II  i,  18,  II  3,  2  Suvarai 
.   .   .   dyvooudt,  IV  2,  38  kvcoti  dpxsl  .   .   .   diXd  mpnzoiouvzat. 

The  same  work  shows  us  that  Socrates  was  accustomed  to 

'  See  also  Engelhardt,  Anacoluth.  Platon.  I  28-34. 


20 

quote  from  the  poets  for  illustration  or  support  in  his  discussions. 
We  have  there  citations  from  Homer,  Hesiod,  Theognis  and 
Epicharmus,  and  he  evinces  considerable  familiarity  with  poetry. 
His  friend  Niceratus  in  the  Convivium  (IV  7,  VH  45)  was  a  good 
Homeric  scholar,  and  he  was  on  intimate  terms  with  the  poet 
Agathon  (id.  VIII  32).  Accordingly  we  are  not  surprised  to  find 
him  quoting  in  our  dialogue  from  Homer,  Simonides  (?  451  E), 
Epicharmus,  and  Euripides.  His  intimacy  with  the  last  named 
is  well  known.'  We  may  also  infer  from  Apol.  22  B  and  Prot. 
339  ff.  that  he  was  fairly  well  versed  in  the  poets,  but  it  is  doubt- 
ful that  he  was  really  acquainted  with  all  the  21  from  whom 
Plato  makes  him  quote,  and,  indeed,  as  it  stands,  his  percentage 
(65)  is  not  very  high.  Out  of  some  220  citations,  or  direct  refer- 
ences, from  the  poets,  Socrates  has  145,  of  which  about  half  (70) 
are  from  Homer.  In  both  Xenophon  and  Plato,  Socrates  uses 
many  rare  words,  but  it  is  probable  that  they  are  due  chiefly  to 
the  authors  themselves,  as  this  is  characteristic  of  their  style  and 
foreign  to  the  simple  nature  of  their  master.'  One  word,  however, 
dixaiuTTi';  (508  A),  as  it  only  occurs  elsewhere  (till  Cassius  Dio)  in 
Prot.  331  B  (Soc.  loq.)  and  three  times  in  Xenophon,  may  perhaps 
be  Socratic.  In  the  Gorgias,  Socrates  has  "jg^  per  cent  of  the 
a-a^  ksyuiisva,  only  a  trifle  more  than  his  share ;  Callicles  and 
Gorgias  are  below  their  ratio,  Polus  above.  Although  Xenophon 
puts  metaphors  and  similes  into  the  mouth  of  Socrates,  he  was 
not  enough  of  a  dramatic  artist  to  imitate  so  closely  the  usage  of 
his  master,  and,  though  they  abound  in  the  sayings  quoted  by 
Stobaeus,  many  of  these  citations  are  of  doubtful  authenticity. 
On  the  other  hand,  from  their  poetic  nature  and  their  great 
increase  in  the  later  dialogues,  we  may  infer  their  Platonic  origin 
(cf.  Demetr.  281,  3  Sp.).  However,  the  comparison  tw  kdya) 
msTzsp  luTpiu  Ttapi-^tiv  (475  D,  480  C),  which  recurs  in  the  Memo- 
rabilia (I  2,  54),  and  the  metaphorical  use  of  Orjpa  and  Oy,ptbui 
(464  D,  490  A,  500  E),  which  is  found  not  only  in  Xenophon  (Mem. 
II  6,  III  II,  7  f.),  but  also  in  a  dictum  quoted  by  Stobaeus  (Flor. 
I  116),  seem  likely  to  have  been  favorite  expressions. 

There  only  remain  a  few  figures,  which  do  not  seem  Socratic, 
nor  yet  directly  satirical,  but  rather  borrowed  from  the  very  sophists 
whom  he  opposed.  Cicero  says  (De  Orat.  I  47):  "<  Plato  in 
Gorgia  >  in  oratoribus  irridendis  ipse  esse  orator  summus  vide- 

'  Diog.  L.  II  18 ;  Cic.  Tusc.  IV  29. 

'  Cf.  Rep.  487  E,  ov  ye  oxik  eludes  "J''  e'cKdvuv  Myetv. 


31 

batur,"  and  Dionysius  (Ad  Pomp.  2),  ayr^imai  .  .  .  fidXiara  toT? 
rupyteioti;  .  .  .  ava^puvtrai  and  further  ZrjXwimi;  T0119  Tzepl  Fopyiav. 
For  some  of  these  sophistic  figures  see  van  Prinsterer  (p.  104), 
and  on  the  whole  subject  of  Platonic  rhetoric,  Novak  (pp.  500- 
521).  In  this  dialogue  we  find  the  metaphors  and  similes  pre- 
viously mentioned,  as  vdarj/xadStxia? — utcouXov  (480  B,cf.479  B),/;Ot>ff^ 
po/^  XT?..  (486  D),  Xoyot  ins^ip^et  (492  D)  and  ini^ecpw/iEv  (495  C), 
fis/xtrjffae  to.  /itydka  (497  C),  dvaOiaOai  and  iitavopOou  (461  D),  ffxmzoi 
.  .  ,  auvTsivovra  (507  D),  aiSrjpol.'i  xai  dSapavrivutt  X6yot<;  .  .  .  Xutret 
{^og  A),  xara^axTecsv  Xoyot^  (^^12  C),  piJTopss  .  .  .  ^|cT£ff«v  (517  A), 
xaOep^Tj?  (461  D),  k-Ki^fiipi^iuv  (474  A,  76  A),  and  in  similes  (481  DE) 
the  two  Sripot,  wtntsp  rotirt' (502  E),  i;j.T:XrjiTavzeq  to  vytsivou  (518  C);  493 
A-E  are  borrowed.  Other  comparisons  come  under  thehead  of  ex- 
amples (p.  23).  Add  also  the  artistic  assonance,  <pdiav  xui  xoa/iwrr^za 
xalaw^poauvrjv  xalSuacorrjza  (^^08  A);  the  Strong  personification  T£';^i'a? 
.  .  .  deanoha^  (518  A),  7  xokaxsoztx-q  aiaOojiivrj  .  .  .  dTzoduffa  (464  C), 
(505  D)  puOot;  .  .  .  avsu  xstpakfji;  Tzspttjj,  <  ij  xu/Sepi/r^Tixi]  >  ov  <Teij.vi)- 
verat  ia^rnjLartff/xevrj  (511  D)  •<  ffo^f?  >  oiSeT  xai  utzouXo^  (518  E), 
T^ps/xsT  6  kuyoi;  (527  B),  Siaizep  r^ys/xovt  toT  Aoyw  (527  E)  ;  and  the 
alliteration  nksuorrtv,  Tzhwre'iv '  ttXoutoo  yap  ivsxa  rrX.ioufftv  (467  D) 
•  and  nvtyiuv  dnopeXv  ttoisT,  izixporaza  izmpaza  .  .  .  tzsvjTiV.  Perhaps 
also  the  frequent  annominatio  may  be  due  to  this  influence. 
Though  anaphora  is  very  common  in  the  Memorabilia,  it  seems 
unlikely  a  priore  that  it  was  really  much  used  by  Socrates.  Here 
we  find  uuro^  (510  C)  and  'KnXiruo'i  (513  B).  While  chiasm  is 
more  or  less  natural  (to  the  Greek),  some  of  the  more  artistic 
forms,  which  we  encounter  here,  seem  due  to  rhetorical  training. 
(Cf.  467  D  Ttliouai,  481  D  'AXxificddrji,  493  C  dnXTJaTw?,  497  C  Xoizdiv, 
500  E  d<po7zoita,  522  A  loj^aivtov,  B  ■Kowuvza.') 

B. — His  Character. 

If  one  feature  of  Socrates'  character  stands  out  in  bolder  relief 
than  another,  it  is  his  modesty,  real  or  assumed.  He  ironically  pro- 
fesses to  be  entirely  ignorant  and  sorely  in  need  of  instruction.' 
Olymp.  notes  that  (454  A)  in  e?  n?  pe  epotzo  Socrates  refers  the 
fault  to  himself,  and  not  to  Gorgias,  while  in  eXeyxs  xa\  iXiy^ou 
(462  A)  he  admires  the  pizpiov  ^doq  in  the  modest  order  of  the 
words  (cf  B.  kpmza  7/  d-Koxpivoo).  In  the  same  line  is  his  naivet6 
xa\  iySt  (454  B),  <pwp£v  yj  pij  <pS)pev ;  (480  D),  and  euphemism  ^  eVt 

'  453  B,  A,  55  B,  58  E,  62  E,  74  A,  88  A  ;  cf.  Memor.  i,  2,  34. 


22 

Tt  <re  ipwTZ  (494  E).  His  deep  religious  feeling,  which  is  so  mani- 
fest in  the  Apol.,  Crito  and  Phaedo,  appears  throughout  the 
closing  myth.  By  the  phrase  r.apa  too  jzarpo?  TzapiXa^ov  (523  A), 
he  reverently  avoids  allusion  to  the  enmity  of  Zeus  and  Kroncs, 
and  he  refers  the  guidance  of  his  own  life  to  God  (512  E,  cf  Apol. 
41  D,  Cr,  54  E).  Consequently  he  maintains  his  private  judgment 
against  all  authority  of  man  (472  AB,  88  A  f.,  526  D,  cf.  Apol. 
29  C,  Cr.  44  C,  etc.).  That  enmity  to  the  democracy  which  has- 
tened his  death  crops  out  in  the  references  to  his  fate  (p.  3),  in 
his  condemnation  of  the  statesmen  (515  B  ff.),  and  in  the  parallel 
of  the  two  fickle  5rjiioi  (481  D  ff.). 

II. — His  Philosophy. 

A.  Sources. — The  discussion  of  the  sources  of  Socratic  philo- 
sophy lies  outside  the  province  of  this  treatment.  One  class  of 
scholars,  chief  of  whom  are  Hermann,  Grote  and  Uberweg, 
prefers  the  testimony  of  Xenophon  to  that  of  Plato,  while  another, 
represented  by  Schleiermacher  (Berlin  Acad.  18 18),  Brandis  and 
practically  Zeller,  claims  greater  fidelity  for  Plato,  but  makes  use 
also  of  Xenophon  and  Aristotle.  This  correct  position  Wytten- 
bach  thus  summarizes,  "  In  Xenophonte  imago  Socratis ;  in 
Platone  ipse  Socrates."  Fouill6e  (Paris,  1874)  and  others  aptly 
remark  that  Plato  presents  the  ideal  (sTSo?)  Socrates,  and  Schleier. 
thinks  that  the  philosopher  is  faithfully  and  artistically  portrayed, 
but  as  the  method  and  spirit  of  Socrates  sway  all  the  thought  of 
his  pupil,  Plato  puts  in  his  mouth  what  he  believed  to  be  the  con- 
sequences of  his  teaching,  as  well  as  the  teaching  itself.  It  is 
generally  agreed  that  Symp.  215-222  was  intended  to  be  a  true 
description  of  the  character  and  method  of  the  philosopher  (cf. 
Hermog.  372,  12  Sp.),  and  Brandis  mentions  Prot,  Lach.,  Meno, 
Char.,  Gorg.  as  those  dialogues  which  most  faithfully  set  forth 
his  teachings.  Most  scholars  would  add  the  Apol.  and  Crito. 
The  Prot.  and  Gorgias  especially  resemble  the  Memorabilia  in 
the  fuller  and  more  independent  answers  given  by  the  interlo- 
cutors, and  even  Hermann  says  that  our  dialogue  exhibits  "  ganz 
Sokratische  Dialektik." 

B.  The  method  of  Socrates'  dialectic  presents  two  sides,  posi- 
tive and  negative.  The  latter  shows,  by  means  of  critical  exam- 
ples, the  change  and  contradiction  of  opposing  ideas,  and  their 
consequent  untruth.    This   so-called  irony  appears  in  490  C-E 


23 

and  494  C-E,  while  514  DE  gives  the  reductio  ad  absurdum. 
Allusion  is  made  to  this  treatment  in  the  Memorabilia  (I  4,  i,  IV 
2,  39).  The  positive  side,  maieutic,  directs  attention  to  the  uni- 
versal necessity  and  real  nature  of  things  by  means  of  induction 
and  definition.  The  first  step  in  induction  is  the  example,  which 
is  generally  drawn  from  the  most  ordinary  spheres  of  action. 
Callicles  objects  to  its  vulgarity  (491  A,  97  C),  and  so  did  Critias 
(Xen.  Mem.  I  2,  37,  cf.  Sym.  221  E,  Ar.  Nub.  385  f.).  Socrates 
himself  (Xen.  Oec.  XVII  15)  speaks  of  the  advantage  of  the  ^ 
method. 

In  the  Gorgias  we  have  shoemakers  (447  E),  weavers  (49  D), 
painters  (53  E),  physicians (467  C,  77  Ef.,  79  A),  merchants  (67  D, 
77  E  f.,  518  B),  foolish  boys  (497  E),  poets,  flute  and  lyre  players 
(501  Eff.),  statesmen  (503  C,  15  D  ff.),  pilots  (11  D),  engineers 
(512  BC),  cattle-trainers  (516  A,  cf.  Xen.  Mem.  I  2,  32),  charioteers 
(16  E),  cooks  (18  B),  and  teachers  of  gymnastics  (520  C).  More- 
over, the  choice  of  various  public  officials  (455  B)  and  the  nature 
of  sickness  (496  A)  are  adduced.  The  inductive  process  naturally 
follows  closely  and  applies  these  examples  (cf.  Xen.  Mem.  IV  6, 
15).  It  is  illustrated  most  forcibly  in  the  final  reduction  of  the 
argument  with  Polus  (474  DE,  76  C-E,  78  B),  and  in  the  clinching 
of  the  refutation  of  Callicles  (496  C-E,  98  B,  E  ff.).  Expressions 
like  (498  E)  aukXoyiaai  zi  <suni3aivsi  (cf.  496  E)  ix  ruiv  biJLokoyqixivwv 
(cf.  476  D,  80  A)  indicate  the  consummation  of  the  process.  Often, 
though  not  always,  the  result  of  induction  is  definition  (Xen.  Mem. 
IV  6,  Ar.  Met.  XIII  4),  which  is  necessary  to  the  full  and  exact 
knowledge  demanded  by  Socrates.  First  we  find  rhetoric  defined 
(447  D-53  A)  by  Gorgias,  then  persuasion  (53  B-55  A),  then 
rhetoric  again  by  Socrates  (462  C-66  A).  Power  (470  B),  honor 
(474  E),  punishment  (76  A)  and  happiness  (73  D)  have  each  its 
place,  while  the  stronger  and  the  better  (488  D,  89  E),  good  and 
bad  pleasures  are  carefully  distinguished  (495A-500  A).  The 
words  opo<:  and  {!iC)6pi':oiJ.ai  (as  470  B,  75  A,  88  D,  95  A,  513  D)  or 
diatpiu)  (495  C)  often  point  to  this  stage  of  the  discussion. 

Besides  these  fundamental  principles,  certain  external  devices 
are  employed,  (i)  An  imaginary  objector,  or  questioner,  is 
introduced,  who  usually  represents  the  general  public  (cf.  Prot. 
311  D,  12  D,  30  C,  53A-56  E,  Symp.  200  CD).     In  this  dialogue 

&aittp  av  £t  TJ?  epotzo  (45 1  A,  C,  54  D),  sfjzot  ay  6  iarp6<;  (452  A— C), 
v6;jLi(rov  un'  ixtivwv  dvspwzaaOai  (452  D)  mark  the  query  and 
implied  objection.    This  is  more  polite  (and  more  forcible)  than 


24 

to  make  the  criticism  directly,  and  is  therefore  employed  against 
Gorgias  alone.  (2)  The  speaker  may  quote  the  previous  state- 
ments of  his  opponents,  in  order  to  be  certain  that  they  are  rightly 
understood  (cf.  Prot.  349  BC,  ^9  AB,  Xen.  Mem.  IV  6,  14).  The 
formulae  employed  are  ippi^'fi  raura  rj  06 ;  (460  D),  oux  ufirt  eXsyei; ; 
(466  D,  88  E),  slTTsq;  (73  D),  ^5?  ;  (92  D,  98  E),  xazd  rdv  adv  Uyov 
(88  E),  ouTu)  aou  vo(i.iZovT«^  (72  D),  ^  6p0uii};tifivr]fiat  ;  (88  B,  cf.  95  D). 
The  requisites  for  discussion  are  three,  iTztanj/j-yj,  eo-j<na,  Tzappijaia 
(487  A,  cf.  Lach.  178  AB  with  181  D),  and  the  purpose  of  dialectic 
is  the  discovery  of  truth.  Hence  Socrates  is  ready  iUy^scu  or 
ikiy/Etrda:,  whichever  will  attain  this  object,  and  this  position  he 
carefully  states  to  each  successive  interlocutor  (458  AB,  62  A,  506 
A,  C  ;  cf.  Char.  166  B.). 

One  factor  of  Platonic  dialectic,  division,  is  denied  to  Socrates 
by  Brandis,  his  reasons  being  Aristotle's  reference  of  the  process 
to  Plato  alone,  its  prominence  in  the  non-Socratic  Sophistes  and 
Politicus,  and  its  close  connection  with  the  doctrine  of  ideas. 
Campbell,however,  recognizes  \ts  germ  in  Socrates,  while  Fouill^e 
holds  that  it  is  essential  to  definition,  which  is  the  result  and  union 
of  induction  and  deduction,  and  cites  the  alphabetic  classification 
of  the  Memorabilia  (IV  2,  13  ff.).  His  deductions  were  inexact, 
and  reached  only  probable  results,  since  they  rested  on  concrete 
classes  (ji^r, ;  Mem.  IV  6,  12),  but  Plato  improved  and  systema- 
tized the  process,  basing  it  on  transcendental  concepts  (s^Srj). 
However,  even  if  the  latter  view  be  correct,  such  divisions  as 
those  of  rhetoric  and  pleasure  (463  E  ff.  and  474  E)  seem  too 
elaborate  to  have  been  made  by  Socrates.  Such  simpler  forms  as 
the  two  classes  of  persuasion  (454  DE)  and  the  recognition  of 
good,  bad  and  indifferent  (468  A  ff.)  might  be  ascribed  to  him 
more  readily,  and,  indeed,  the  latter  is  more  or  less  implied  in  the 
relative  nature  of  good  and  evil  (v.  Mem.  Ill  8,  IV  2,  31-36). 

C.  His  Doctrines. — This  subject  has  been  thoroughly  treated 
by  Brandis  (Rh.  Mus.  1827)  and  Ribbing  (Upsala,  1870),  and  the 
larger  part  of  the  Gorgias  they  have  incidentally  attributed  to 
Socrates.  Upon  examination  of  those  portions  of  the  dialogue 
not  thus  classified,  the  following  are  shown  by  comparison  with 
Xenophon  and  the  earliest  Socratic  dialogues  (v.  p.  22)  to  be  the 
views  of  Socrates,  (i)  The  identification  of  a^'otfov  with  wft^-Ji/iwK 
(468  C,  75  A  ;  Mem.  IV  6,  8,  Prot.  333  E)  and  with  y.aX6v,  and 
consequently  xaxuv  with  ata^pdv  (474  D  ff. ;  Mem.  Ill  8,  7,  IV  6,  9, 
Lys.  2i6  D).     (2)  The  community  of  interest  is  essential  to  friend- 


25 

ship  (507  E,  510  B;  Mem.  II  6,  21-23,  Plato  often).  (3)  The 
chief  aim  of  the  statesman  must  be  the  benefit  of  the  state,  not 
personal  power  (5 10  D-i  I  A,  13E,  15C,  17C;  Mem.  Ill  2:  6,3ff.). 
(4)  The  statesman  must  have  previous  training  (514  B-E;  Mem. 
Ill  6 :  9,  10,  IV  2,  2).  (5)  The  good  can  suffer  no  harm  (527  D  ; 
Apol.  41  D).  (6)  Moderate  eating  is  essential  to  health  (518  CD  ; 
Mem.  Ill  13,  2:  14).  The  argument  (480B-81  B)  that  punish- 
ment should  be  sought  for  guilty  friends,  but  kept  from  guilty 
enemies,  is  merely  an  extension  of  the  results  of  the  preceding 
discussion,  and  though  itself  not  directly  comparable  with  other 
views  of  the  philosopher,  it  is  quite  in  the  Socratic  spirit.  While 
the  precise  distinction  of  xpsh-wv  and  /ScAn'tuv  (488  C^  is  not  found 
elsewhere,  and  Socrates  seems  to  use  them  interchangeably  in  the 
Prot.  (358  C),  the  differentiation  of  yvAaOai  and  elvai  in  the  same 
dialogue  (340  BC),  and  Socrates'  frequent  claim  to  be  the  pupil  of 
Prodicus  (Prot.  341  A,  Mem.  II  i,  21,  etc.)  make  it  not  improbable 
that  the  distinction  is  his  own.  Moreover,  this  is  an  essential  of 
definition.  The  discrimination  of  ^56  and  ayaOov  (497  A,  D),  and 
the  difficulty  of  separating  good  and  bad  pleasures  (500  A),  are 
implied  in  the  Memorabilia  (IV  2,  35,  36,  cf.  Lys.  221  A,  B). 
Socrates  emphasizes  the  great  value  of  geometric  balance  of 
character,  and  of  geometry  in  general  (508  A),  but  in  the  Memo- 
rabilia (IV  7,  2,  3)  he  condemns  any  careful  study  of  the  science. 
The  defenders  of  Platonic  testimony  discredit  the  statement  of 
Xenophon,  and,  indeed,  the  neglect  of  systematic  knowledge  is 
contrary  both  to  the  liberal  Socratic  spirit  and  to  true  philosophy. 
The  pupil  of  such  a  teacher  would  hardly  write  above  his  door, 
fj.Tjds'i^  ayBat;j.iTprjTO(;  slairtu. 

The  acquaintance  of  Socrates  with  the  views  and  systems  of 
previous  philosophers  is  evinced  by  the  summary  which  he  makes 
in  the  Memorabilia  (I  i,  14).  In  the  Gorgias  he  cites  two  mythi- 
cal comparisons  (493  A  f ),  which  go  back,  ultimately  at  least,  to 
the  Pythagoreans."  Even  if  they  are  taken  from  Empedocles 
(Olymp.),  or  Heraclitus  (Schuster),  it  is  probable  that  they  merely 
borrowed  them  from  the  Pythagoreans,  upon  whom  they  were 
largely  dependent.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  theory  of 
cosmic  harmony  (507  E),  whose  fdia  suggests  the  <p0.6zy]?  of  the 
Sicihan.  Pythagorean  influences  are  more  apparent  in  the  later 
dialogues,  and  it  is  doubtful  that  Socrates  made  much  use  of  this 
system.     The  quotation  from  Anaxagoras  (465  D)  is  quite  con- 

'  V.  Hirzel,  Comm.  hon.  Momms.,  p.  11. 


m- 


26 


sistent  with  Socrates'  knowledge,  for  in  the  Memorabilia  (IV  7, 6, 
7)  he  criticizes  by  name  the  views  of  that  philosopher,  and  in  the 
Phaedo  (97  B)  states  that  he  had  listened  to  the  reading  of  one 
of  his  books.  The  closing  myth  shows  considerable  familiarity 
with  the  Orphic  hymns,  of  which  Socrates  could  not  have  been 
wholly  ignorant.  The  poetic  coloring  and  rhetorical  nature,  how- 
ever, point  to  Plato,  and  the  myth,  as  an  integral  part  of  dialectic, 
was  one  of  his  most  characteristic  creations.  Xenophon  and  the 
earliest  dialogues  show  no  trace  of  its  employment  by  Socrates, 
and  Plato,  perhaps  again  under  sophistic  influence,  first  used  it  as 
an  engine  of  philosophic  thought  (v.  Hirzel,  74,  Nov&k,  502  f.) 


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